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The Sociology of Intellectual Life is the latest salvo from Steve Fuller in his ongoing
fight for a strongly prescriptive philosophy of science. Fuller’s writing is
pugnacious, passionate, and unabashedly political. He clearly detests the ‘‘under-
labourer’’ mentality he believes prevails among his colleagues, and he draws
strength and succour from such past philosophical champions as Karl Popper and
Paul Feyerabend in urging contemporary philosophers to push past the narrow
horizon of normative evaluation and re-embrace their lost mission as the normative
legislators of moral and scientific life (p. 79).
The bogeyman behind the allegedly disastrous state of today’s academy is
Thomas Kuhn. Fuller claims that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has
exercised a baneful influence over philosophers, pushing them to embrace the
undignified role of underlabourer, sweating down in the boiler room of modern
science whilst the ship’s wheel has been seized by the malfeasant hands of a neo-
liberal political elite bewitched by the morally bankrupt imperatives of an
incorrigible global capitalism. Evidence of Kuhn’s insidious influence can be seen
in the proliferation of narrow specialisms within the philosophy of science—
‘‘philosophy of physics’’ and ‘‘philosophy of biology’’ are Fuller’s two examples—
wherein a philosopher may know more about the science in question than she does
about philosophy proper. The lamentable result is a philosopher with diminished
capacity to view science with a critical eye (p. 80). No doubt some philosophers of
the special sciences will be surprised to hear that their career path has been shaped,
in significant part, by the long arm of Thomas Kuhn. But no matter. Fuller’s work is
smart and sophisticated, and we should feel lucky to have him in our midst,
haranguing us for what he perceives to be our intellectual sins. He is the Socratic
gadfly underwriting Popper’s ‘‘open society’’.
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Yet Fuller is not content to fight alone. He wants more philosophers to join him in
his battle, to cast aside the cosiness of academic insularity and become full-blown
public intellectuals. Indeed, the book expresses the irrepressible hope that the
pendulum of philosophical fortunes will finally swing back his way (p. 82). And not
just that: it also lays out an ambitious action plan. Fuller calls for nothing less than a
radical reformation of the twenty-first-century university.
Here Fuller takes his lead from German philosopher and statesman Wilhelm von
Humboldt (1767–1835). Accordingly, the book falls into three main chapters, each
reflecting a part of what Fuller believes to have been Humboldt’s philosophical
vision: one on the university; one on philosophy; and one on intellectuals. A fourth
chapter, which I will not discuss, considers the improvisational character of
intellectual life.
Fuller interprets Humboldt as viewing the university as a site for the ‘‘creative
destruction of social capital’’ (p. 36). Researchers produce new knowledge (social
capital), and teachers disseminate it (creative destruction). Yet this elegant weave of
research and teaching has now come unravelled through the incursion into the
academy of private market interests. In today’s ‘‘knowledge economy’’, teaching is
increasingly reduced to the dispensation of employment ‘‘credentials’’; research, in
turn, is increasingly privatized as intellectual property (pp. 10–11). Fuller argues
that this situation has fostered an inequitable distribution of knowledge, and thus
violates Humboldt’s original vision of the university as the production site for
‘‘universal’’ knowledge (p. 4). For Humboldt, the attainment of universal forms of
knowledge required that public dissemination, or teaching, be integrated into the
epistemic production process. In this spirit, Fuller argues that the teachability of new
knowledge for the general public must be a precondition for any legitimate claim to
epistemic progress (p. 33).
The brunt of Fuller’s criticism is borne by the natural sciences, whose failure to
include disciplinary history in their curricula discourages students from critically
reflecting on the basic assumptions underpinning their fields (p. 28). Things are,
according to Fuller, much better in the humanities and the softer social sciences, and
especially in philosophy, where pedagogy strongly influences research trajectory by
recapitulating historical debates surrounding perennial problems (p. 27). Fuller thus
proposes that the entire university curriculum be reformed to bring it into line with
the pedagogical tradition most clearly evident in philosophy (p. 33). This, he claims,
will help bring about the Enlightenment goal of lifting citizens out of their current
state of moral immaturity and equipping them for full participation in public life
(pp. 39–40). Humboldt’s university supplies the necessary vehicle for realising this
remarkable vision, with philosophers stationed at the helm.
The only problem is that philosophers are not really up to the job. ‘‘Anglophone’’
philosophers, in particular, have abdicated philosophy’s prescriptive function (p. 82);
the professionalization and specialization of their field has caused them to retreat from
public affairs and normative pronouncements (p. 63). Philosophy, writes Fuller, has
become ‘‘politics in exile’’ (p. 54). As a result, philosophical research is at higher risk
of producing ‘‘ideological wild cards available to the highest bidder’’ (p. 62). Once
again, the culprit most responsible for this sad state of affairs is the nefarious Thomas
Kuhn (p. 79).
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As a foil for today’s cowed academic, Fuller introduces the intellectual. The
academic does not hold up well in comparison. Whilst the intellectual speaks
thoughts, the academic only mimes them (p. 84). The intellectual is creatively
reckless where the academic is feckless (p. 108). The academic, if she forgets to
bring her Powerpoint to a presentation, is panic-stricken. The intellectual, caught
under similar fire, remains cool and in control (p. 84). The intellectual cares about
ideas and knows how to use them. The academic, alas, does not (p. 84). Whilst most
academics are rhetorically inept (p. 141), the intellectual possesses considerable
rhetorical skill (p. 93). The intellectual loathes the immodest use of citation which,
Fuller tells us, blights academic writing. The academic, meanwhile, trots dutifully
up to the trough, performing acts of ‘‘ventriloquism’’ and ‘‘argument by name-
check’’ in an undignified display of ‘‘institutionalized cowardice’’ (pp. 85–86).
Of course, an academic can always join the ranks of the intellectual. In doing so,
she will assume an ethic that is ‘‘exhilarating and harsh’’ (p. 87); she will become ‘‘a
member of the political or scientific (or preferably both) vanguard whose socio-
cognitive horizons are somewhat wider and clearer than those of the normal member
of society’’(p. 94); she will walk among those who live ‘‘exemplary lives that are
admired from afar and to which lesser mortals aspire in a future incarnation’’; and,
through a studied sense of responsibility, she will strive to ‘‘rais[e] those mortals to
their own lofty heights – if possible, in the same lifetime’’ (p. 94). For this, Fuller
declares the academic cum intellectual and her fellow travellers ‘‘moral heroes’’,
serving as ‘‘necessary correctives’’ to the prevailing ‘‘herd mentality’’ (pp. 95, 104).
How might one beat back the deleterious effects of Thomas Kuhn, curing the
academic philosopher’s critical anaemia, lifting her from the boiler rooms of the
underlabourer and encouraging her to set her shoulder to the stone of progressive
social change? How, in other words, might one ‘‘institutionalize the moral courage
of the public intellectual’’ (p. 108)? Here Fuller delivers a spirited plea for the
strengthening and restructuring of the academic tenure system, turning tenure into
a ‘‘guild privilege’’ which ‘‘compel[s] academics to function as public intellectuals
to demonstrate that they [are] worthy of their privileges’’ (p. 109). In exchange for
their active, critical opposition to the status quo, academics will be rewarded with
the luxury of freedom and autonomy within ‘‘a state-protected market for
intellectual life’’ (p. 111). Under this simultaneously strict and emancipatory
regime, critical academics would possess a precious and inalienable ‘‘right to be
wrong’’ which guarantees their safety by enabling their ideas to die in their stead
(p. 38). They would be entitled, writes Fuller, to defend such offensive claims as
‘‘that the Holocaust never took place, that Blacks are intellectually inferior to
Whites, or that thermodynamics render evolution impossible’’ (p. 37). The only
condition is that they defend their claims publicly with arguments laid bare to
critical scrutiny, fulfilling what Fuller calls the ‘‘noblesse oblige’’ of the critical
academic dedicated to the cause of Enlightenment (p. 133).
The Sociology of Intellectual Life offers a wide-ranging and eccentric defence of
the privileges and obligations of critical practice in the twenty-first century
academy. No doubt some readers will be thrilled by its ambitious attack on
mainstream academia. Others will just as surely be appalled by the bucket of scorn it
pours on their own professional practices. In any case, Fuller’s project is finally
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motivated by his assumption that the Humboldtian university offers ‘‘the most
reliable vehicle for social progress in the modern era’’ (p. 111). Fuller never bothers
to defend this claim, and the reader’s opinion of the book will depend significantly
on how willing she is to accept it as self-evident, and hence above critical scrutiny.
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